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All My Rights
by Carl E. Schneider

D

iane Pretty was an Englishwoman in her early 40s who
had been married nearly a
quarter of a century. In November
1999, she learned she had amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis-in Britain, motor neurone disease. Her condition deteriorated
rapidly, and soon she was "essentially
paralysed from the neck downwards."'
She had "virtually no decipherable
speech'' and was fed by a tube. She was
expected to live only a few months or
even weeks. AB a court later explained,
however, "her intellect and capacity to
make decisions are unimpaired. The
final stages of the disease are exceedingly distressing and undignified. AB she is
frightened and distressed at the suffering and indignity that she will endure if
the disease runs its course, she very
strongly wishes to be able to control
how and when she dies and thereby be
spared that suffering and indignity."
Suicide is not a crime in Britain, but
assisting suicide is. On 27 July 2001,
Mrs. Pretty's solicitor wrote the Director
of Public Prosecutions asking for an assurance that her husband would not be
prosecuted if he helped his wife commit
suicide. The DPP refused because it
would not "grant immunities that condone, require, or purport to authorise or
permit the future commission of any
criminal offence, no matter how exceptional the circumstances."
On 20 August, Pretty sought judicial
review of the DPP's decision. She conceded she had no claim under "the common law of England," but she argued
that a 1961 assisted suicide statute violated the European Convention on

Human Rights. On 29 November
2001, the House of Lords affirmed a
lower court's refusal to countermand
the DPP's decision. The leading judgment in the House of Lords analyzed
the Convention's provisions at length
and commented that its decision was
"in accordance with a very broad international consensus. ABsisted suicide and
consensual killing are unlawful in all
Convention countries except the
Netherlands, but even if [Dutch law]
were operative in this country it would
not relieve Mr Pretty of liability ... if he
were to assist Mrs Pretty to take her
own life." Mrs. Pretty had argued that
she was not challenging the statute generally, but saying only it should not
apply in "the particular facts of her case:
that of a mentally competent adult who
knows her own mind, is free from any
pressure and has made a fully-informed
and voluntary decision." The judgment
invoked Dr. Johnson: "First, 'Laws are
not made for particular cases but for
men in general.' Second, 'To permit a
law to be modified at discretion is to
leave the community without law. It is
to withdraw the direction of that public
wisdom by which the deficiencies of
private understanding are to be supplied'.''
On 21 December 2001, Pretty took
her case to the European Court of
Human Rights. On 29 April, it rejected
her claim. Four of her arguments the
court readily dismissed. First was her argument that the 1961 act violated Article 2 of the Convention: "Everyone's
right to life shall be protected by law."
Mrs. Pretty thought that article "pro-

tected the right to life and not life itself." The court concluded, however,
that Article 2 could not "without a distortion of language, be interpreted as
conferring the diametrically opposite
right, namely a right to die.'' On the
contrary, Article 2 was "first and foremost a prohibition on the use of lethal
force or other conduct which might
lead to the death of a human being.''
The court made similarly short shrift
of Mrs. Pretty's argument that the 1961
act violated Article 3: "No one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."
Mrs. Pretty alleged that the statute "discloses inhuman and degrading treatment for which the State is responsible
as it will thereby be failing to protect
her from the suffering which awaits her
as her illness reaches its ultimate stages.''
But the court said that Article 3 was
most commonly applied to "intentionally inflicted" acts of a state and that
Mrs. Pretty's interpretation "places a
new and extended construction on the
concept of treatment.''
Nor did the court labor over Mrs.
Pretty's claim that the 1961 act violated
Article 9's protection of "freedom of
thought, conscience and religion." The
court honored Mrs. Pretty's convictions,
but held that they did not "involve a
form of manifestation of a religion or
belief, through worship, teaching, practice or observance.''
Perhaps less easily, the court also dismissed Mrs. Pretty's claim that the 1961
act violated Article 14's assurance that
the Convention's rights "shall be secured
without discrimination on any ground
such as sex, race, [and] colour." The
court said there was "objective and reasonable justification for not distinguishing in law between those who are and
those who are not physically capable of
committing suicide." The essence of the
court's reason is that Mrs. Pretty's argument would open an exception to the
prohibition on assisted suicide that
would too greatly increase the risk that
the vulnerable would be hustled toward
unwanted deaths.
More substantially, Mrs. Pretty invoked Article 8: "Everyone has the right
to respect for his private and family
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life." The court acknowledged that "the
concept of private life is a broad term"
that "covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person." It also acknowledged that although "no previous
case has established as such any right to
self-determination as being contained in
Article 8 ... , ... the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle
underlying the interpretation of its
guarantees." And it acknowledged that
the article protected the right to refuse
medical treatments even if refusal meant
death. Indeed, the court proclaimed
that the "very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and

intimate area of an individual's sexual
life." But "States are entitled to regulate
through the operation of the general
criminal law activities which are detrimental to the life and safety of other individuals." The 1961 act "was designed
to safeguard life by protecting the weak
and vulnerable," especially "those who
are not in a condition to take informed
decisions." Perhaps Mrs. Pretry was not
vulnerable, but "it is the vulnerability of
the class which provides the rationale
for the law in question." Furthermore,
the court proposed to defer to member
states: "It is primarily for States to assess
the risk and the likely incidence of

Both courts announced with cautious imprecision a
right to freedom in making medical decisions. But both
courts intimated that assisted suicide statutes
serve legitimate ends.

human freedom." Thus the court was
"not prepared to exclude that" the 1961
act "constitutes an interference" with
Pretty's "right to respect for private life
as guaranteed under Article 8 § 1."
Section 1? Aye, there's the rub. Article 8 has a second section which forbids
"interference by a public authority''
with a Section 1 right unless that interference "is in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others."
Was the state's interference with Mrs.
Pretty's asserted Section 1 right "necessary"? Yes. The "notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds
to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued; in determining
whether an interference is 'necessary in
a democratic society', the Court will
take into account that a margin of appreciation is left to the national authorities." That "margin of appreciation" is
"narrow as regards interferences in the
July-August 2002

abuse if the general prohibition on assisted suicides were relaxed or if exceptions were to be created. Clear risks of
abuse do exist, notwithstanding arguments as to the possibility of safeguards
and protective procedures.... "
But was not the 1961 act's flat ban
on all assisted suicide overbroad? No,
because the ban was not so absolute as
the statute's text implied. Assisted suicide could not be prosecuted without
the DPP's approval, and courts could
impose light sentences. In fact, "between 1981 and 1992 in 22 cases in
which 'mercy killing' was an issue, there
was only one conviction for murder,
with a sentence for life imprisonment,
while lesser offences were substituted in
the others and most resulted in probation or suspended sentences."
In short, Mrs. Pretty perhaps had a
section 1 right, but the United Kingdom surely had a section 2 interest that
justified its infringing that right. A
state's laws may "reflect the importance
of the right to life, by prohibiting assisted suicide while providing for a system
of enforcement and adjudication which
allows due regard to be given in each
particular case to the public interest in

bringing a prosecution, as well as to the
fair and proper requirements of retribution and deterrence."
Comparisons between legal systems
are notoriously perilous. Yet the American lawyer cannot help observing that
despite abundant differences in attitude
and approach between American and
European courts, 2 there are notable similarities between the European Court of
Human Rights' Pretty v. The United
Kingdom and the U.S. Supreme Court's
assisted suicide decision in Washington
v. Glucksberg. Both courts interpreted
"constitutional" provisions drafted in
grand and spacious terms. Both courts
announced with cautious imprecision a
right to freedom in making medical decisions. But both courts intimated that
assisted suicide statutes serve legitimate
ends, and both courts feared that abrogating those statutes would start the law
down a lethally slippery slope. Finally,
both courts apparently recoiled from
the daunting labor of judicially devising
and imposing a regime of assisted suicide that would be legally convincing,
administratively workable, and politically acceptable.
When Mrs. Pretty learned of the
court's decision, she said, "The law has
taken all my rights away." On 3 May
2002, she had breathing problems and
was taken to a hospice. On 11 May,
with her husband by her side, she died.
Her death, the hospice director said,
was "perfectly normal, natural and
peaceful."
1. All quotations are from the opinion of
the European Court of Human Justice.
2. C.E. Schneider, ''America as Panern and
Problem," Hastings Center Report 30 (2000):
20.
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